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 26 
Summary 27 
Explaining cooperative behaviour is fundamental issue for evolutionary biology. The 28 
problem any cooperative strategy faces is minimizing risks of non-reciprocation 29 
(cheating) in interactions with immediate costs and delayed benefits. One of a variety 30 
of proposed strategies, the raise-the-stakes (RTS) strategy posits that individuals 31 
establish cooperation by increasing investment across interactions from an initial 32 
interaction. This model has received little quantitative support, however, probably 33 
because individuals of many social species engage in repeated interactions from a 34 
young age. In some situations, however, such as following conflicts, after prolonged 35 
absences, or during social instability, established relationships may become unreliable 36 
predictors of future behaviour, create an environment for RTS. We investigated 37 
grooming interactions among wild male chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), testing RTS 38 
in these specific contexts. We found evidence that male chimpanzees employed RTS 39 
during social instability, but not under the other conditions. However, this patterning 40 
of grooming interactions was, we suggest, less to do with preventing cheating and 41 
more to do with avoiding the elevated risks of intra-male aggression during the period 42 
of social instability: social instability raises the stakes for grooming by creating a 43 
more hazardous marketplace in which to trade. 44 
 45 
 46 
47 
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Introduction 48 
Explaining cooperative behaviour is a fundamental question for evolutionary 49 
biology (West et al. 2006). While cooperation between related individuals is often 50 
accounted for by indirect benefits and inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton 1964a, b), 51 
cooperation between unrelated individuals is typically explained by invoking the 52 
theory of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) with its exchange of direct costs and 53 
benefits, albeit delayed in time. Functionally, this is mutualism rather than altruism as 54 
all actors receive direct fitness benefits and is better described as direct reciprocity 55 
(Clutton-Brock 2009).  56 
 57 
The problem faced for any cooperative strategy is how to minimize risks of 58 
non-reciprocation (cheating) in interactions in which costs are immediate but benefits 59 
are delayed. A variety of strategies have been proposed, building on the iterated 60 
prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) model suggested by Trivers (1971). Axelrod and 61 
Hamilton’s (1981) ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy (TfT), under which individuals start out 62 
cooperating and match their opponent’s behaviour in previous interactions, refusing to 63 
cooperate only if the partner does so first, is evolutionarily stable. TfT has found 64 
some support but seems restricted to simple social exchanges (e.g. serranid coral-reef 65 
hermaphroditic fish: Fischer, 1988), or artificial experimental situations (e.g. predator 66 
inspection by sticklebacks and guppies: Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1988). Strategies 67 
based on an IPD model assume cooperation to be an ‘all-or-nothing’ affair, and that 68 
interacting individuals have no other potential social partners (Noë 1990, 2001); in 69 
consequence, a variety of further models with more applicability to biological systems 70 
have been proposed, such as Biological Markets theory (Noë 2001, 2006; Noë and 71 
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Hammerstein 1994, 1995), pseudo-reciprocity (Connor 1986), parcelling (Connor 72 
1992) and raise-the-stakes (Roberts and Sherratt 1998; Sherratt and Roberts 2002). 73 
 74 
Raise-the-stakes (RTS) describes a strategy in which co-operators increase 75 
investment in a social interaction if the partner matches or betters their opponent’s last 76 
move. It allows cooperation to be incremental, rather than ‘all-or-nothing’, and 77 
individuals’ investment in a relationship can vary over a series of interactions 78 
(Roberts and Sherratt 1998; Sherratt and Roberts 1999). RTS allows the animals to 79 
‘test the water’, before investing in potentially costly cooperative behaviours; at the 80 
very least, it allows them to limit their losses. This strategy is robust against ‘subtle 81 
cheaters’: individuals that invest less than in previous interactions (Roberts & Sherratt 82 
1998; Van den Berg and De Witte 2006) and generates predictions that can be easily 83 
tested in animal systems (Keller and Reeve 1998). Support for RTS has been found in 84 
species as diverse as the sawfly Perga affinis, where cohesion among gregarious larva 85 
is maintained through tapping signals and the group’s investment (Fletcher 2008), and 86 
humans Homo sapiens, where subjects increased monetary donations to a social 87 
partner if that partner matched their investment (Roberts and Renwick 2003; Majolo 88 
et al. 2006; Van den Berg and De Witte 2006) but not where the partner was a 89 
previously established friend (Majolo et al. 2006; Krebs 1970). 90 
 91 
The initial presentation of the RTS strategy was supported by data on 92 
grooming reciprocity in impala Aepyceros melampus (Roberts and Sherratt 1998) and  93 
social grooming should be an ideal behaviour with which to test the usefulness of 94 
RTS as an explanation for reciprocity: the total amount of grooming that one 95 
individual performs for another is easily broken down into smaller ‘episodes’ of 96 
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investment, and that investment can be quantified by time spent giving grooming 97 
(Roberts and Sherratt 1998; Keller and Reeve 1998). Grooming offers benefits to the 98 
recipient, in terms of ectoparasite removal (Mooring et al. 2004) and stress reduction 99 
(Aureli et al. 1999; Gust et al. 1993; Kaburu et al. 2012) at some costs to the groomer, 100 
such as reduced vigilance (Maestripieri 1993; Cords 1995; Mooring and Hart, 1995) 101 
and resting time (Dunbar 1992). Studies of grooming in non-human primates, 102 
suggested as an example system for RTS by Keller and Reeve (1998), have failed to 103 
find support for this strategy, however (Barrett et al. 2000; Manson et al. 2004; 104 
Fruteau et al. 2011).  105 
 106 
RTS assumes an initial interaction from which reciprocity can develop and so 107 
appears most applicable to situations where individuals are forming new cooperative 108 
relationships (sensu Hinde 1976). In many animal groups, however, most observed 109 
social interactions are merely the latest of a series of interactions that may have 110 
started in infancy: the relevance of RTS for understanding persistent reciprocity 111 
between members of complex social groups has therefore been questioned (Barrett et 112 
al. 2000; Barrett and Henzi 2006). There are several possible scenarios under which 113 
this history of interactions may be negated, at least temporarily. These could include 114 
aggressive conflicts, prolonged absences from a group or periods of high social 115 
instability. If this occurs, and individuals cannot rely on their prior history of 116 
interactions to predict future behaviour, they may need to use strategies such as RTS 117 
to re-establish cooperative relationships. The impact of such contexts on grooming 118 
strategy has not been examined. 119 
 120 
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Here we examine grooming exchanges among wild male chimpanzees (Pan 121 
troglodytes) for evidence of the RTS strategy. The grooming behaviour of adult male 122 
chimpanzees offers a good model system for the investigation of reciprocity. Previous 123 
work has shown that chimpanzees tend to reciprocate grooming exchanges (Newton-124 
Fisher 1997, 2002; Newton-Fisher & Lee 2011; Watts, 2000; Mitani 2006; Arnold 125 
and Whiten 2003; Gomes et al. 2009; Boesch and Boesch-Achermann, 2000). 126 
Furthermore, chimpanzees tend to break down grooming bouts into small episodes 127 
(sensu Barrett et al. 2000), the length of which can vary both within and across bouts. 128 
The chimpanzee social system is characterised by fluid associations, with any 129 
particular set of individuals often only stable on a timescale of minutes or hours and 130 
individuals may be out of contact with particular others for hours or days as a result 131 
(Reynolds 1965; Nishida 1968).  132 
Given the results of previous studies of primate grooming exchanges (Barrett et 133 
al. 2000; Manson et al. 2004; Fruteau et al. 2011), we predict that RTS will not be a 134 
strategy employed during social stability (prediction 1). In contrast, we predict that 135 
they will adopt RTS in contexts where relationships may be ‘reset’: that is, where 136 
prior histories of interaction may become unreliable predictors of the behaviour of 137 
social partners, thus creating a need to re-establish grooming relationships. We focus 138 
on three specific contexts:  139 
1. The aftermath of aggressive conflicts. Across a range of primate species both 140 
aggressor and victim tend to be more anxious after a conflict (reviewed in 141 
Aureli and Smuncy 2000), especially where they had previously shown a high 142 
level of affiliation (Kutsukake and Castles 2001; Aureli, 1997; Cords and Aureli 143 
2000). Conflicts can potentially jeopardize the relationship between two 144 
individuals (Aureli and de Waal 2000; Cords and Aureli 2000; Aureli et al. 145 
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2002; Silk 2002) and former opponents may try to repair their relationships 146 
(Cords and Aureli 2000) by reconciling (de Waal and van Roosmalen 1979; Silk 147 
2002), suggesting that they can no longer rely on prior history to guide future 148 
cooperation. Reconciliatory tendency in wild chimpanzees is relatively low, 149 
however, occurring in only 12-16% of dyads (Arnold & Whiten, 2001; 150 
Kutsukake & Castles, 2004; cf. 27-35% in captivity: de Waal & van 151 
Roosmalen; Preuschoft et al 2002), so RTS may provide an alternative strategy 152 
(prediction 2). 153 
 154 
2. After prolonged absence. Male chimpanzees may be apart from others for many 155 
days or weeks if they pursue a consortship mating strategy, by which they 156 
isolate themselves and a single (cycling) female from the rest of the social 157 
group in an attempt to gain exclusive mating access (Tutin 1979; Goodall 1986; 158 
Nishida 1997; Matsumoto-Oda 1999). The duration of this separation, together 159 
with shifting patterns of interactions between other males, may create a context 160 
in which males re-joining the other members of the social group may be unable 161 
to rely on past history and need to employ the RTS strategy to re-establish 162 
cooperative relationships (prediction 3).  163 
 164 
3. During periods of social instability. Loss of key individuals through predation 165 
or, particularly in chimpanzees, conspecific lethal violence (Newton-Fisher & 166 
Emery Thompson 2012), may disrupt existing patterns of social interaction 167 
and/or destabilise rank hierarchies (Wey et al. 2008; Cheney and Seyfarth 168 
2009). During our study period, a phase of elevated aggression rates and high 169 
instability in the male hierarchy followed the killing of the incumbent alpha-170 
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male of study community (Kaburu et al. 2013). We use this dramatic shift to 171 
examine whether male chimpanzees employ RTS in their grooming interactions 172 
in periods of high social instability (prediction 4).  173 
 174 
Materials and Methods 175 
Data collection 176 
 177 
The study was conducted between February and November 2011 on the M-178 
group chimpanzee community of the Mahale Mountains National Park, Tanzania (for 179 
descriptions of the field site see: Nishida 1990, 2012; Nakamura and Nishida 2012). 180 
The study group initially consisted of 10 adult males (≥16 yr), 5 adolescent males (9-181 
15 yr), 2 juvenile males (5-8 yr), 3 infant males (0-4 yr), 23 adult females (≥14 yr), 7 182 
adolescent females (7-13 yr), 5 juvenile females (3-6 yr), and 5 infant females (0-2 183 
yr). During data collection, two females gave birth, one female joined the community, 184 
while two cycling females disappeared (and were assumed to have dispersed to 185 
another group), and one adult male, the alpha, was killed (Kaburu et al. 2013). 186 
 187 
Eight adult males were followed through day-long focal sessions (Altmann 188 
1974). Each day, the individual previously sampled less frequently was selected as 189 
focal animal in an effort to equalise number of hours of observation across 190 
individuals. To assure independency between the focal samples, the same animal was 191 
not followed during two subsequent days. A total of 397 hours of observation were 192 
recorded (Table 1; mean ± SD / focal male = 49 ± 5 hours).  193 
 194 
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Data concerning grooming bouts were collected using both focal animal and 195 
ad libitum sampling. Grooming sessions were thoroughly described by voice using a 196 
dictaphone. Specifically, the identity of the partners, the time spent giving or 197 
receiving grooming, and events when one or both the individuals stopped grooming 198 
were recorded. Bouts that were underway at the beginning of the observation period 199 
and/or whose pattern could not be accurately observed due to poor visibility were 200 
discarded. Additionally, from focal animal samples, we collected directed aggressive 201 
interactions in which an individual attacked a specific partner either by physical 202 
contact (e.g. kicking, hitting, slapping) or by chasing or agonistic displays. 203 
 204 
Data analysis 205 
 206 
A grooming bout was defined as a dyadic grooming interaction where one or 207 
both individuals exchanged episodes of grooming, and it was considered ended when 208 
both males engaged in other activities, including simple resting, for more than 30s 209 
(after Newton-Fisher and Lee 2011). We defined intra-bout episodes as unbroken 210 
continuous grooming given by one individual. An episode ended when neither of the 211 
groomer’s hands was in contact with the recipient.  212 
 213 
We looked for evidence of RTS both across and within grooming bouts, and 214 
tested our predictions for the absence (during social stability) and presence (in 215 
specific contexts) of the RTS strategy as detailed below. Except where indicated, all 216 
analyses were conducted using SPSS (ver. 20). 217 
 218 
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To test prediction 1, we analysed grooming interactions collected in the period 219 
February-September 2011, which corresponded to a period of social stability (Kaburu 220 
et al., 2013). If RTS was used as a strategy across grooming interactions, then we 221 
expected to see (a) an increase in the length of episodes across grooming bouts, as 222 
evidence of increasing investment in a cooperative relationship, and (b) the amount of 223 
grooming performed in one bout to match the amount received in the previous bout, 224 
as the strategy requires at least matching of the partner’s previous investment. We 225 
used two-tailed Spearman’s rank correlations to examine the relationship between 226 
length of episodes and order of occurrence, for each male’s grooming history for each 227 
grooming partner. We restricted this analysis to those males recorded performing at 228 
least five episodes. To avoid pseudo-replication, the contribution of each male to each 229 
of his grooming dyads was tested individually, giving 45 possible dyads and 90 230 
possible groomer-receiver combinations. These results were combined using a 231 
weighted Z-test (Stouffer et al. 1949; Whitlock 2005), implemented by the program 232 
MetaP (Dongliang 2009). This method is preferable to Fisher’s test for combining 233 
probabilities (Sokal and Rohlf, 1981) as it is not sensitive to small (hence significant) 234 
p-values and treats large and small p-values equally: the weighted Z-test is less likely 235 
to result in a type I error (Whitlock, 2005). In order to control for the different 236 
contributions of each male to the dataset, weights were selected as the number of 237 
grooming episodes that individuals performed. 238 
 239 
We used a Linear Mixed Model (LMM) to test whether the amount of 240 
grooming performed in one bout matched the amount received in the previous bout. 241 
LMM offers the opportunity to assess the effect of multiple independent variable(s) 242 
while controlling for repeated sampling of the same individuals (treated as random 243 
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factors: Pinheiro and Bates 2000). Our dependent variable was duration of grooming 244 
performed, while duration of grooming received in the previous bout involving the 245 
same dyad was set as an independent factor. Grooming durations were log-246 
transformed to normalise the data. We controlled for the differential contribution of 247 
dyads by including dyad identity as a factor. Identities of groomer and recipient were 248 
treated as random factors, while the number of grooming bouts was set as repeated 249 
measurement. It was possible to conduct this type of analysis as each focal animal 250 
was followed for the whole day, which offered the opportunity to identify the 251 
temporal sequence of grooming interactions between each grooming pair. Grooming 252 
bouts in chimpanzees can be either unidirectional (only one individual takes the role 253 
of groomer) or bidirectional, with the latter involving either alternating or 254 
simultaneous grooming; many bouts include a combination of these structures. 255 
Unidirectional grooming is common (e.g. Newton-Fisher and Lee 2011; Gomes et al. 256 
2009; see results), and we included episodes from unidirectional bouts as well as 257 
those where both members of the dyad groomed as unidirectional grooming is likely 258 
to play an important role in ensuring that grooming is reciprocated over time (Gomes 259 
et al 2009).  260 
Following Barrett et al. (2000), we tested for evidence of RTS within bouts by 261 
examining whether duration of grooming episodes matched or exceeded previous 262 
episodes both performed and received, for each reciprocated bout in which partners 263 
alternated the roles of groomers and receivers. We assigned a plus sign when either 264 
the initiator (i.e. the individual who started the bout) or the reciprocator (i.e. the 265 
individual who returned the grooming) increased or matched grooming time 266 
throughout the bout compared to either their own previous episodes or partner’s 267 
previous contribution, excluding periods of simultaneous (mutual) grooming. We 268 
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grouped bouts on the basis of the number of intra-bout episodes, and analysed only 269 
those groups where at least 5 dyads contributed data. We used two-tailed sign-test to 270 
assess whether the number of bouts in which there was a consistent increase in the 271 
duration of grooming episodes (indicated by a plus sign) significantly exceeded the 272 
number of bouts in which there was no consistent increase in grooming episode 273 
duration (indicated by a minus sign). The p-values from these multiple tests were then 274 
combined with the weighted Stouffer’s Z-method. In this case weights were selected 275 
as the number of bouts that contributed to each group. 276 
 277 
Context 1: after conflicts 278 
 279 
Following Arnold and Whiten (2001), we defined the post-conflict context as 280 
the 30-minute period following an aggressive interaction. The window of opportunity 281 
for grooming provided by this context is short, and so we looked for evidence of RTS 282 
exclusively within bouts. We extracted grooming interactions between former 283 
opponents from post-conflict contexts and analysed bouts containing at least three 284 
episodes, as explained above.  285 
 286 
Context 2: After prolonged absence 287 
 288 
During the study, two adult males (PR & AL) engaged in consortship 289 
behaviour; in both cases with the same cycling female (EF). The consortship between 290 
PR and EF started on 7th of March. This was interrupted after 42 days (on 18th of 291 
April), but resumed on the 21st of April, lasting another month (until 24th of May). 292 
The consortship between AL and EF started on the 6th of August 2011, and lasted 52 293 
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days (concluding on 27th of September). We examined all grooming bouts recorded 294 
within one month after each male resumed normal association with the other adult 295 
males. We tested for RTS both across and within-bouts as explained above. Unlike for 296 
the analysis conducted during social stability, we carried out one-tailed Spearman’s 297 
rank correlation tests as we predicted a positive relationship (an increase in episode 298 
length across bouts). 299 
 300 
Context 3: Social instability 301 
 302 
The alpha male (PM) for most of our study period was killed in a coalitional 303 
attack on 2nd of October, triggering a period (hereafter: the ‘unstable period’) of high 304 
rank instability and increased aggression rates (Kaburu et al. 2013). We extracted 305 
grooming data collected in this period, and compared grooming interactions with 306 
those collected in the period prior to this event (hereafter: the ‘stable period’). For this 307 
comparison we included grooming bouts recorded both from focal and ad libitum 308 
observations, and grooming data collected from the two non-focal males (DW and 309 
XM). Across the two periods, we used Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (two-tailed) to 310 
compare (a) the mean duration of grooming bouts for each dyad (N = 35); (b) the 311 
mean episode length and the number of episodes per bout for each male (N = 9), and 312 
(c) rates of both bouts and episodes for focal males (N = 7). We had previously 313 
determined that rates of aggression were significantly elevated in the ‘unstable period’ 314 
(average rate per male: 0.45 vs. 0.16 interactions/hr; T= –2.37, N = 9, P = 0.018: 315 
Kaburu et al, 2013); to investigate whether rates of aggression changed within this 316 
period, we derived daily rates of aggression by dividing the number of aggressive 317 
interactions recorded during each observation day by the observation time, and used a 318 
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two-tailed Spearman’s rank correlation test. Additionally, since, in chimpanzees, 319 
during social instability males are often observed disrupting grooming interactions 320 
between rivals (de Waal 1982, 1984; Nishida 2012; personal observations), we tested 321 
whether, in the period following PM’s death, temporal variation in episode length was 322 
predicted by aggression rates. To this end, we ran an LMM analysis in which males’ 323 
daily mean grooming episode length was treated as dependent variable, while rates of 324 
aggressive interactions males participated either as aggressor or as a victim were 325 
entered as fixed factors. The ID of the males was entered as random factor and the 326 
number of days males were recorded grooming was included as repeated measure. 327 
Finally, we tested for RTS both across and within bouts, as described above. 328 
Results 329 
We collected 593 complete grooming bouts and 2168 grooming episodes in 330 
the stable period, corresponding to 51hr 45min of grooming time, with a mean across 331 
dyads of 13.17 bouts (± SD = ± 12.30; median = 9), and 48.18 episodes (± SD = ± 332 
45.41; median = 38). Mean bout length was 5min 16s (± SD = ± 7 min 36s; median = 333 
2 min 42s). Grooming rate was 1.10 bouts/hr, and 9 min 58s of grooming/hr.  Mean 334 
episode length was 1min 34s (± SD = ± 1min 45s; median = 1 min, range = 1s – 335 
20min 2s). Most bouts (69%: 412/593) were unidirectional. The majority (51%: 336 
93/181) of bidirectional bouts were a mixture of alternating and simultaneous 337 
grooming; 29% (52/181) combined unidirectional and simultaneous grooming, while 338 
only a small proportion were exclusively alternating (15%: 27/181) or simultaneous 339 
(5%: 9/181) grooming. 340 
 Across bouts, mean episode duration tended to significantly decrease over 341 
time, with 65% of the individuals showing a negative trend (weighted Z-test: mean rs 342 
= – 0.09, P < 0.001; Table 2). Additionally, the duration of grooming performed did 343 
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not match that received in the previous intra-dyadic bout (LMM: Estimate ± SE = 344 
0.10 ± 0.07, Wald = 2.014, P = 0.158).  345 
Within bout, groomers did not increase the length of grooming episodes in 346 
response to the duration of their own previous contribution (weighted Stouffer’s Z 347 
method: N = 3, P = 0.97; Table 3). Additionally, the number of bouts in which 348 
individuals increased episode duration in response to the duration of partner’s 349 
previous episode length was significantly lower than the number of bouts in which 350 
there was no increase of episode duration (weighted Stouffer’s Z method: N = 2, P  < 351 
0.001; table 3). Therefore, male chimpanzees did not raise the stakes during social 352 
stability supporting prediction 1. 353 
 354 
Context 1: after conflicts 355 
 356 
Of 114 aggressive interactions involving focal individual, only 23 were 357 
followed by a grooming session between former opponents. Of these, more than half 358 
(52%: 12/23) were unidirectional, whilst the others were a combination of mutual and 359 
alternating grooming. We found no convincing evidence that males consistently 360 
increased the duration of grooming episodes during post-conflict grooming bouts 361 
either in relation to their own previous contribution or to partner’s (Table 4). Our data 362 
therefore do not support prediction 2: male chimpanzees did not raise the stakes in 363 
post-conflict grooming. 364 
 365 
Context 2: After prolonged absence 366 
 367 
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We collected 112 grooming bouts between the consorting male and the other 368 
adult males across the two post-consortship months. These bouts included 455 369 
episodes, totalling 7hr 48min of grooming. Most groomers tended to significantly 370 
decrease episode duration over time (weighted Z-test: mean rs =  ̶  0.04, P  < 0.001; 371 
Table 2) and the amount of grooming an individual received during a bout did not 372 
significantly predict the amount of grooming he gave the partner in the subsequent 373 
bout (LMM: Estimate ± SE = 0.17 ± 0.11, Wald = 1.032, P = 0.449). Within bout, 374 
males did not show significant increase in episode duration either in relation to their 375 
own previous contribution, or to partner’s (Table 5).  Our data therefore do not 376 
support prediction 3: male chimpanzees did not raise the stakes following periods of 377 
absence. 378 
 379 
Context 3: Social instability 380 
 381 
We recorded 18hrs 10min of grooming across 254 bouts during the ‘unstable 382 
period’, consisting of 773 episodes, with a dyadic mean of 7.06 bouts (± SD = 7.28; 383 
median = 6.50) and 21.47 episodes (± SD = 27.22; median = 11.50). In this ‘unstable 384 
period’, males appeared to change their grooming behaviour when compared to the 385 
previous ‘stable period’. Grooming bouts were significantly shorter (median bout 386 
length: ‘stable period’ = 290s; ‘unstable period’ = 186s; Wilcoxon signed-test: Z = – 387 
2.072, N = 35, P = 0.038) also showing a strong trend towards shorter episodes 388 
(median episode length: ‘stable’ = 96s, ‘unstable’ = 65s: Z = – 1.955, N = 9, P = 389 
0.051). Median rates of both episodes (‘stable’= 2.41/hr; ‘unstable’= 5.39/hr: Z = – 390 
2.028, N = 7, P = 0.043) and bouts (‘stable’= 0.88/hr; ‘unstable’ = 2/hr: Z = – 2.197, 391 
N = 7, P = 0.028) increased significantly, while the number of episodes per bout 392 
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significantly decreased (median ‘stable’ = 3.16 episodes/bout, ‘unstable’= 2.32 393 
episodes/bout: Z = – 2.547, N = 9, P = 0.011).  Overall, these results show that during 394 
the unstable period, males engaged in shorter but more frequent grooming bouts, 395 
which contained fewer and shorter grooming episodes.  396 
 397 
Mean length of grooming episodes increased across bouts in the period of 398 
social instability, with individuals significantly increasing episode duration over time  399 
in more than half of the dyads (weighted Z-test: average: rs = + 0.063, P < 0.001; 400 
Table 2). Additionally, the amount of grooming individuals received during a bout 401 
significantly matched the amount of grooming they gave their partner in the following 402 
bout (LMM: Estimate ± SE = 0.22 ± 0.10, Wald = 4.590, P = 0.035). Only 23 bouts, 403 
which correspond to 9% of the total number of bouts collected during social 404 
instability, incorporated more than two intra-bout episodes. Within those bouts, 405 
individuals did not significantly increase grooming episode duration in relation to 406 
their own previous contribution (weighted Stouffer’s Z-method: N = 2, P = 1; Table 407 
6). Similarly, the number of bouts in which individuals did not increase episode 408 
duration in response to partner’s previous contribution significantly exceeded the 409 
number of bouts in which episode duration increased throughout the bout (weighted 410 
Stouffer’s Z-method: N = 2, P < 0.001; Table 6). These results indicate that M-group 411 
males during social instability raised the stakes across bouts by increasing episode 412 
length across subsequent grooming interactions and matching partner’s grooming 413 
investment in the previous bout, which supports prediction 4, although they did not 414 
raise the stakes within bout. 415 
While rates of aggression were higher in the ‘unstable period’ than in the 416 
‘stable period’ (Kaburu et al., 2013), these tended to decrease across the period, 417 
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although the relationship did not reach significance (rs =  ̶  0.316, N = 32, P = 0.078). 418 
Finally, daily variation in episode length was not significantly predicted by aggression 419 
rates (LMM: Estimate ± SE = 0.31 ± 0.30, Wald = 1.097, P = 0.299). 420 
 421 
Discussion 422 
 423 
We found no support for raise-the-stakes as a grooming-allocation strategy 424 
among wild male chimpanzees during periods of social stability (supporting our 425 
prediction 1), a result consistent with studies on monkeys (Papio cynocephalus: 426 
Barrett et al. 2000; Macaca radiata & Cebus capuchinus: Manson et al 2004; 427 
Cercocebus atys & Chlorocebus aethiops: Fruteau et al. 2011). Male chimpanzees 428 
might not raise the stakes not only because of the long history of social interactions 429 
that characterize group members, but also because of the time limits that constrain 430 
them. In other words, as during a day individuals have to engage in a broad range of 431 
activities, including grooming more than one partner (Henzi et al. 1997; Dunbar, 432 
1992), increasing grooming time with a partner might not always be a viable strategy 433 
(Barrett et al. 2000).  Contrary to our predictions 2 and 3, male chimpanzees did not 434 
use the strategy in either post-conflict situations or after prolonged absence. However, 435 
we did find support for raise-the-stakes during social instability, supporting our 436 
prediction 4: in this context, individuals matched partner’s contribution from the 437 
previous bout and showed a general tendency to increase their grooming investment 438 
across bouts, which was not a by-product of the decrease of aggression rates across 439 
the unstable period. .  440 
 441 
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These findings suggest that RTS might be a viable strategy not only while 442 
cooperating with strangers but also in periods of social instability when relationships 443 
– prior histories of interaction – between the individuals become unreliable. Such 444 
instability may create conditions of uncertainty and unpredictability, comparable to 445 
situations in which individuals have to cooperate with strangers.  446 
 447 
Grooming is commonly viewed as a means to build trust (Seyfarth 1977, 448 
1980; Dunbar 1988, 1991; Henzi et al. 2000; Watts, 2002) to create a platform (a 449 
relationship) upon which future cooperation and contingent fitness benefits can be 450 
based (Hinde, 1976). Under this ‘valuable relationships’ model (Kummer 1978; Cords 451 
and Aureli 2000), we can conclude that trust was not sufficiently disrupted by either 452 
long absences caused by consortships or routine acts of aggression to require a RTS 453 
strategy to rebuild a relationship. The analysis of post-conflict contexts reveals also 454 
that not only did male chimpanzees not increase their investment, but also that 455 
former opponents rarely engaged in grooming bouts after conflicts, which is 456 
consistent with previous studies on this community (Kutsukake and Castle, 457 
2004). It is possible that given the social stability that characterized the 458 
majority of the study period, with low rates of male-male aggression (Kaburu 459 
et al., 2013), aggressive interactions and the shifting of social interactions 460 
between group members might have had a minimal negative impact on social 461 
relationships between former opponents or for consorting males, and, thus, 462 
males might have not needed to rebuild predictable cooperative relationships 463 
‘from scratch’ after conflicts, or after a prolonged absence.Additionally, Male 464 
chimpanzees might have no need to employ a RTS strategy to rebuild trust or repair 465 
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relationships after conflict or long periods apart if grooming is traded for other 466 
commodities and for itself (Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011; Watts 2002; Mitani 2006; 467 
Gomes and Boesch 2011), or if groomers receive immediate benefits by decreasing 468 
their stress levels (Shutt et al. 2007) or feeding on the parasites removed (Tanaka and 469 
Takenfushi, 1993; Onishi et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2010). Male chimpanzees, 470 
however, raised the stakes when there was an increase in social instability. The 471 
unexpected and unusual coalitional killing of the alpha male appeared to have offered 472 
a condition that led individuals to (re)-build predictable cooperative relationships: the 473 
trust on which social relationships were built broke down and needed to be re-474 
established. Our study therefore provides the first evidence of raise-the-stakes in 475 
primate social grooming, albeit restricting to a particular context. 476 
 477 
The presence of a raise the stakes pattern across bouts, including 478 
unidirectional grooming (see data analysis), and its simultaneous absence within bout 479 
confirms that unidirectional grooming plays an important role in male strategies to 480 
enforce grooming reciprocation. In contrast, studies on monkeys have generally 481 
focused exclusively on grooming bouts in which both partners groomed (Barrett et al. 482 
2000; Manson et al. 2004; Fruteau et al. 2011). While this makes sense for species 483 
whose grooming bouts are predominantly reciprocated within bout, such as vervet 484 
monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops) and sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys)  as 90%  of 485 
their grooming bouts were found to be reciprocated (Fruteau et al. 2011), this 486 
approach is less understandable for species in which reciprocated bouts are less than 487 
half of the total number of bouts, which is the case of, for instance, chacma baboons 488 
(31-51%: Barrett et al. 1999), bonnet macaques (5-7%: Manson et al. 2004), and 489 
white-faced capuchins (12-27%: Manson et al. 2004). The results presented in this 490 
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chapter indicate that unidirectional grooming should receive more consideration in 491 
future studies and its importance in the analysis of grooming interactions should not 492 
be discounted.  493 
Since our analysis is based on an unusual social context (i.e. social instability 494 
due to the alpha male’s death) and on a relatively small sample size (e.g. only two 495 
males were recorded spending a considerable amount of time far from the other group 496 
members) our results need to be taken with caution. Nevertheless, our study 497 
highlights the importance of considering the possibility that individuals adopt some 498 
strategies to enforce reciprocation and avoid cheating in specific contexts, rather than 499 
as a general approach. Given the complexity of chimpanzee social system and 500 
grooming patterning, it would not be plausible to suppose that male chimpanzees 501 
engage in a single strategy to assure reciprocation. In contrast, it is more likely that 502 
they change the strategies adopted in relation to, for instance, the stability of the 503 
hierarchy, rank relationships, or the presence of bystanders. Therefore, future work 504 
might attempt to test for the RTS strategy in specific social contexts in which a re-505 
establishment of predictable cooperative relationships is needed, such as during social 506 
instability among male baboons following the immigration of new males (Wittig et al. 507 
2008; Beehner et al. 2005), or in chimpanzee communities, such as Kanyawara 508 
(Kibale, Uganda) that exhibit higher rates of aggressive interactions (Muller 2002; cfr. 509 
Kaburu et al., 2013), or that show higher levels of post-conflict grooming (e.g. 510 
Ngogo: Watts, 2006). This might potentially shed light on whether partners that can 511 
no longer rely on their prior history of interactions resort to a RTS strategy to re-512 
establish cooperative relationships. 513 
 514 
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Table 1. Number of focal observation hours on each of 8 adult male chimpanzees.  524 
 525 
 526 
 527 
 528 
 529 
 530 
 531 
 532 
 533 
 534 
*PM  was killed on the 2nd of October 2011 (Kaburu et al. 2013). 535 
536 
Focal Individuals Focal Observation Time 
AL 49hr 45min 
BB 54hr 53min 
CT 48hr 54min 
DE 53hr 11min 
FN 46hr 01min 
OR 47hr 03min 
PM* 40hr 14min 
PR 57hr 15min 
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 537 
Table 2. Spearman rank correlation between length and order of occurrence of 538 
grooming episodes. The grooming contribution of each male to each of the grooming 539 
dyad he was part of was tested individually and the results were combined through 540 
weighted Z-test. Only males that performed at least 5 grooming episodes were 541 
included in the analysis. The table shows 1) the context from which grooming data 542 
were extracted, 2) the range of p values, 3) the range of coefficients of Spearman’s 543 
correlations (rs) and 4) the percentage of individuals showing a positive trend 544 
(grooming episodes increased over time) and a negative trend (grooming episodes 545 
decreased). RTS in post-conflict context was analysed exclusively within-bout (Table 546 
4).  547 
Context N p range rs range 
% rs 
(+) 
% rs 
(-) 
Social stability 71 0.00<p<0.934 -1<rs<0.835 35 % 65% 
After prolonged absence 25 0.019<p<0.466 -0.9<rs<0.6 40% 60% 
Social instability 39 0.01<p<0.497 -0.80<rs<0.771 57% 43% 
 548 
 549 
 550 
 551 
 552 
 553 
 554 
 555 
25 
 
Table 3. Sign tests to assess whether groomers increase episode duration in response 556 
to their own previous contribution or to partner’s during social stability (February-557 
September 2011). The test was run only when at least five dyads contributed to a 558 
group, but we included also groups for which the test was not run to show the trend. 559 
 560 
 561 
N = number of intra-bout episodes. 562 
 563 
 564 
 565 
 566 
 567 
 568 
 569 
 570 
Increase across bouts 
in response to their own previous contribution in response to 
partner’s 
 previous contribution 
Initiator Reciprocator    
N Yes No 
Sign 
test 
     P  
Yes No 
Sign 
test 
    P  
  Sign 
test 
   P  
3 15 20 0.5 - - - 5 30 <0.000 
4 6 4 0.754 5 5 1 1 9 0.021 
5 1 3 - 3 1 - 1 3 - 
6 0 3 - 0 3 - 0 3 - 
7 0 1 - 1 0 - 0 2 - 
23 0 1 - 0 1 - 0 1 - 
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Table 4. Sign tests to assess whether groomers increase episode duration in response 571 
to their own previous contribution or to partner’s in post-conflict context. The test 572 
was run only when at least five dyads contributed to a group, but we included also 573 
groups for which the test was not run to show the trend. 574 
 575 
N = number of intra-bout episodes. 576 
 577 
 578 
 579 
 580 
 581 
 582 
 583 
 584 
 585 
Increase across bout 
in response to their own 
previous contribution 
   in response partner’s 
previous contribution 
 Initiator  Reciprocator     
N Yes No 
Sign 
test 
     P 
Yes No 
Sign 
test 
     P 
Yes No 
Sign 
test 
     P 
 2 5 0.453    1 6 0.125 
4 1 1 - 0 2 - 0 2 - 
7 0 1 - 0 1 - 0 1 - 
21 0 1 - 0 1 - 0 1 - 
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Table 5. Sign tests to assess whether groomers increase episode duration in response 586 
to their own previous contribution or to partner’s after a prolonged absence due to 587 
consortship. The test was run only when at least five dyads contributed to a group, but 588 
we included also groups for which the test was not run to show the trend. 589 
 590 
 591 
N = number of intra-bout episodes. 592 
 593 
 594 
 595 
 596 
 597 
 598 
 599 
 600 
 601 
 602 
 603 
Increase across bout 
in response to their own previous contribution in response to 
partner’s previous 
contribution 
 Initiator 
 
Reciprocator 
 
  
 
N Yes No 
Sign 
test 
    P 
Yes No 
Sign 
test 
   P 
Yes No 
Sign 
test 
   P 
3 1 4 0.375    0 5 0.063 
4 2 0 - 0 2 - 0 2 - 
7 0 1 - 0 1 - 0 1 - 
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Table 6. Sign tests to assess whether groomers increase episode duration in response 604 
to their own previous contribution or to partner’s during social instability. The test 605 
was run only when at least five dyads contributed to a group, but we included also 606 
groups for which the test was not run to show the trend. 607 
 608 
 609 
N = number of intra-bout episodes. 610 
 611 
 612 
 613 
 614 
 615 
 616 
 617 
 618 
Increase across bout 
in response to their own 
previous contribution 
   in response to 
partner’s previous 
contribution 
 Initiator 
 
Reciprocator 
 
  
 
N Yes No 
Sign 
test 
    P 
Yes No Sign 
test 
   P 
Yes No 
Sign 
test 
    P  
3 7 6 1    0 13 < 0.001 
4 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 5 0.06 
5 0 2 - 0 2 - 0 2 - 
6 0 1 - 0 1 - 0 1 - 
7 0 2 - 0 2 - 0 2 - 
